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PART I
IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF INCIDENTS

CHAPTER I
THE SETTING OF THE STUDY
I. THE NEED
Operating Room Safety Hazards Need Identification
Spectacular events command the attention of those who
read about them as well as those who are present when they
occur. Headlines blaze with dramatic incidents and readers
are frequently satisfied with limited information. The les
ser incidents are frequently overlooked. Major hazards are
guarded against while less dramatic and less severe situations
which might become serious are often permitted to go by un
noticed.
This is true in the field of nursing just as it is in
life in general. The fear of the occurrence of a threaten
ing spectacular event can overshadow the little incidents
that often occur and which present a threat to patient safety
even though they cause no injury. These minor incidents must
not be overlooked, for as Marshall has said:
The fact that most patient accidents incur no
injury is not a justifiable excuse for ignoring the
situation. The moral obligation of the hospital and
1

2

its personnel is at stake when a patient suffers
an incident that is not consistent with his care
and treatment.1
Operating room nurses have spent much time discussing
and actively participating in the prevention of explosions
and fires in their area of nursing.

One of the meetings at

the 1957 National League for Nursing Convention was designed
to emphasize the need for prevention of these major hazards.
Much time and thought was spent in presenting and discussing
methods by which these operating room hazards could be con
trolled.
Many articles concerning the prevention of fires and
explosions in the operating room have been written because
lives have been threatened or lost as a result of such occur
rences. However, there is a scarcity of articles concerning
the prevention of other operating room hazards. It is pos
sible the emphasis on this major phase of patient safety has
been so intense that other potential hazards to the patient
have been overlooked. In one recent article, "Safety
Measures in the Operating Room," Creber acknowledged that
danger lay in the lack of recognition and understanding of

1Kathleen

Marshall, "An Analysis of Factors Involved
in Hospital patient Accidents," Unpublished Master's thesis,
University of Buffalo, New York, June, 1958, p. 27,

3

operating room hazards. More than two-thirds of the article
was allotted to the discussion of the dramatic hazards and
2
less than one-third to the less dramatic hazards."

Rolen said that it is often assumed that the accident
prevention programs in hospitals only include fire prevention
and evacuation procedures. This she attributes to the dramatic
aspects of such accident prevention endeavors which cannot be
overemphasized. She has stated:
The better the nurse, the more she does to protect
the patients from injury, and thus automatically, to
further the cause of accident prevention. . . .
Special activities should not be allowed to over
shadow the more commonplace occurrences which con
tribute so much to keeping people safe day after day.3
Incidents Are Needed for Teaching Students of Nursing
Rolen also stated that "nurses are really safety
experts and it is important that they realize it."4 There
fore, it is not unreasonable for the patient to expect safe
nursing care from hospital personnel. Florence Nightingale

3lmogene

Creber, "Safety Measures in the Operating
Room," Nursing Outlook, 6:531, September, 1958.
%arian Rolen, "The Nurses* Role in Accident Preven
tion," Nursing Outlook, 3:588, November, 1955.
4Ibid.,

p. 589.

4

pointed out that, "It may seem a strange principle to enunci
ate as the very first requirement in a hospital that it should
do the sick no harm." 5
The responsibility for preventing these less dramatic
hazards as well as the dramatic, rests with nursing personnel.
Therefore, the teaching of safety should be included in the
educational program for basic students of nursing. The
instructor in operating room nursing should recognise the
need for the prevention of hazards in order to teach patient
safety to students of nursing.
The duration of time allotted to clinical experience
for the student in operating room nursing is being shortened.
This means the quality of teaching must be as meaningful as
possible to the student.

Stack and siebrecht have said that

"safety instruction should be active and whenever possible
involve real situations rather than passive hypothetical
problems."6

Because of the very nature of accident prevention

it must be taught largely through vicarious learning. Muse
stated that vicarious experience is valuable because:

5Florence

Nightingale, Notes on Hospitals, Third
edition, London, Longman's, 1867, cited by Anne L. Austin,
History of Nursing Source Book, New York, G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1957, p. 271.
^Herbert J. Stack and Elmer B. Siebrecht, Education
for Safe Living, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 143.

5
It can become so active a reliving of events and emo
tions as to approximate direct experience. Indeed, scien
tific tests of physiological reactions during vicarious
experiencing reveal that measurable physiological changes
frequently take place within learners which are similar to
those aroused by the direct experience.7
To encourage vicarious learning, incidents which have
actually caused patients harm or have threatened their safety
while in the care of operating room personnel could be used
to supplement the teaching of concepts of safety.

Teaching

of safety must be an "on-going" or continuous process made
meaningful by direct experience and vicarious learning.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to identify incidents
threatening the safety of patients in the care of operating
room personnel and to classify them for use in teaching con
cepts of safety in operating room nursing.
Limitations of the Study
The following were limitations of the study:
1.

Only recent incidents were identified.

The defi

nition of "recent" was left to those who contributed incidents.

'Maude B. Muse, Guiding Learning Experience, New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1950, p. 133.

6
2. Ho attempt was made to identify incidents that
might illustrate all phases of safety.

Incidents which were

most meaningful to the operating room supervisors and clinical
instructors participating were reported.
3. It was recognized that there might be a reluctance
on the part of some hospital personnel to participate in a
study in which they were ashed to disclose incidents that
threatened safety of their patients.
4. Incidents were gathered from operating room person
nel living in Illinois as this is the area in which the studymaker would be working.
Definition of Terms
The terms defined according to use in this study were:
Incident:
Harm:

any observed act that could harm the patient.

damage to tissue or psyche.

Safety:

freedom from damage to tissue or psyche.
III. STEPS IN THE STUDY

The descriptive method of research was used to gather
incidents for use in teaching concepts of safety in operating
room nursing. Whitney stated that "... descriptive research
is fact-finding with adequate interpretation."8

8Frederick

Lamson Whitney, The Elements of Research,
Third edition, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950, p. 160.

X
The plan developed for the accomplishment of the pur
pose of the study consisted of the following steps:
1„

Review of literature to find concepts of safety

and to identify categories of patient safety that might help
in classifying the incidents received.
2. Development of an incident report form.
3. Writing to directors of nurses in the 72 hospitals
included in the study to ask permission to contact the operat
ing room supervisors and clinical instructors.
4. sending of letter and the incident report form to
operating room supervisors and clinical instructors.
5. Classifying the incidents received.
6. Summarizing the study, drawing conclusions, and
making recommendations for further study and for using the
incidents in teaching safety.
This study has been prepared in two parts.

Part I,

Gathering and Classifying the incidents, and Part II, The
Incidents.
IV. SUMMARY
Much has been said about fires and explosions in
the operating room. The question has been raised whether
this emphasis on patient safety has been such that other

8

phases of safety in operating room nursing are being over
looked. The study was conducted to identify incidents
threatening the safety of patients in the care of operating
room personnel and to classify them for use in teaching con
cepts of safety in operating room nursing.

CHAPTER II
CONCEPTS OF SAFETY
There are many concepts to he understood ahout safety.
It is the purpose of this chapter merely to review a few of
the concepts about safety which operating room personnel
should know. These have been considered as they relate to a
definition of safety, the need for safety and safety education,
causes of accidents and the need for specific rules or direc
tives for maintenance of safety and prevention of accidents.
I. DEFINITION OF SAFETY
Safety is a much talked about subject, but one that is
not specifically defined. In the areas of general safety,
industrial safety, and hospital safety, much has been said
about the need for safety and what safety accomplishes but
there is inadequate definition of safety itself. In review
ing literature it was found that safety was defined in various
terms: as a philosophy, as a concept, as an attitude, as a
situation, as an environment. A philosophy of safety was
expressed by Heyd in the following seven statements:
1. Safety is positive. It is a tangible and an
absolute. There is no mysticism or chance in safety.
9

10

2. Safety is a habit.
3. Safety is good common sense.
4. Safety is everybody's business.
5. Safety involves basic economics.
6. Safety is good Christian living. . . we shall do
unto others as we do unto ourselves.
7. Safety is a morale builder.i
Long ago Tolman suggested that safety relieves tension
and prevents accidents thus contributing to a safe environment.2

Mcclain has defined safety in terms of the environ

ment. She considers a safe environment to be one that implies
"freedom from injury or possibility of injury. . . ."
Mcclain considered that there are five types of accidents in
hospitals: (1) mechanical, (2) thermal, (3) chemical, (4)
bacteriological, and (5) psychological.4
Safety means the same thing wherever it is considered.
"Most of the hazards of one kind of occupation are like most
of the hazards of any other kind of occupation." 5 Hospitals
by their very nature are particularly expected to be places

1Edward

H. Heyd, "One Man's Philosophy of safety,"
Hospital Management, 81:47, February, 1956.
•'William H. Tolman and Leonard B. Kendall, safety,
New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1913, p. 8.
^Esther McClain and Shirley Hawke Gragg, Scientific
Principles in Nursing, Third edition, St. Louis: The C. V.
Mosby Company, 1958, p. 50.
4Ibid.

^Hospital Safety Man.ua3,, Chicago: American Hospital
Association and the National Safety Council, 1954, p. 6.

11

of safety, and in general, hospital hazards are similar to
those in other industries. However, there is one area which
6

has different hazards, and that area is the operating room.
II. NEED FOR SAFETY AND SAFETY EDUCATION

Accidents, as a cause of death in the United States,
are surpassed only by diseases of the heart, malignant neoplasms and vascular lesions of the central nervous system.7
Florio pointed out that our country has an injury occurring
every three seconds and a fatality every six minutes."

There

is financial loss associated with every injury and "every job
involves hazards which, if not put under control, can cause
mjury."9
The need for safety is dynamic; it is ever changing.
In a safety monograph for colleges and universities this fact
was corroborated:

°Ibid.
president's Commission on the Health Needs of the
Nation, Building America's Health, America's Health Status,
Needs and Resources—A Statistical Appendix, Vol. Ill, Wash
ington: Government Printing Office, 1953, p. 36.
8A.

E. Florio and G. T. Stafford, Safety Education,
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956, p. 3.
^Hospital Safety Manual, Chicago: American Hospital
Association and the National Safety council, 1954, p. 3.

12

Our scientific and technological advances are so
rapid and result in such complex safety problems that
we are experiencing increasing difficulty in obtaining ^ n
available technical information for our safety programs.
The need for safety extends into all phases of life and when
disregarded, tragedy can occur.
It would seem that the prevalence of accidents in our
society warrants a sound educational program in prevention
of accidents and the consistent practice of safety.

Although

it is a common assumption that people do simple tasks without
instruction, this can be an unreliable supposition.
kept of incidents that occur show this fallacy.

Records

A person

placed in unfamiliar circumstances to work with unfamiliar
equipment and routines will not "naturally" know how to
exercise safety.^"1"
The industrial field has given evidence of what safety
education has accomplished. The National Safety Council has
provided data showing the decline of accidents where safety
- 12

programs have been instxtuted.

10Fifth

National Conference on Campus Safety, Safety
Monographs for Colleges and Universities, Chicago: California
Institute of Technology and National Safety Council, 1958,
p. 13.
J"IHospital

Safety Manual, Chicago: American Hospital
Association and National Safety Council, 1954, p. 27.
•L2Ibid., p. 5.

L3
III.

CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS

Accidents are frequently thought of as being unusual
but they are natural products of unorganized ways of life
presenting problems which originated from the failure to
control conditions of life.13

The National Safety Council

expressed this same idea by suggesting that accident pre
vention involved: (1) machines, equipment and working con
ditions which are hazardous, (2) the failure of personnel
to act in a safe manner, and (3) a combination of the two
14
problems.
The American Hospital Association considers that
15
accidents are caused by unsafe acts and unsafe conditions.
yoder blamed accidents on three causes: (1) unsafe
working conditions, (2) unsafe manner of conducting business,
16
and (3) employment of incompetent workers.

1^Herbert

J. Stack and Elmer B. Siebrecht, Education
for Safe Living, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1942, pp. 18
and 22.
1^'National

Safety council, Accident Prevention Manual
for Industrial Operations, Chicago: William H. Poole Company,
1946, p. 486.
•^"Principles

of Hospital Safety," Hospitals, 30:43,

May 16, 1956.
' 'Dale Yoder, Personnel Management and Industrial
Relations, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943, p. 482.

14

Other causes of accidents were incomplete instruction,
lack of organization, carelessness.
The operating room is considered to he a highly organ
ized department hut the presence of threatening incidents
indicates that there is need for greater efficiency of organ
ization. It is necessary to find the true causes of the
incidents that occur. So often the true cause is covered up
by the explanation that the incident occurred because of care
lessness. "In reality, it may have been due to lack of infor
mation, insufficient skills, improper attitudes—in other
words, to incomplete instruction."1'*

These same ideas were

expressed by Yoder.18
people themselves are the most important factors in
the cause of accidents.

Even the most highly organized

department cannot accomplish its purpose to provide safe care
unless the personnel in the department are safe individuals.
A "safe" individual according to Stack is "one who is well
informed, possesses superior skills and desirable attitudes
19

and uses these in his everyday activities."

It the operat

ing room nurse is a "safe" person, she should possess these

1'stack,

op. cit., p. 42.

1SYoder,

op. cit., p. 489.

1 :stack,

op. ext., p. 41.

3L5
attributes and should be able to provide a safe environment
for the patients in her care. In order to assure safe
operating room nurses, an on-going educational program is
urged for inservice study of safety, as well as a thorough
safety education program for students of nursing.
IV. CATEGORIES OF ACCIDENTS AND DIRECTIVES
As there is so much about safety that is similar regard
less of the place of application, it was thought there might
be some classification of principles which would aid in the
understanding of safety. In studying the previously referred
to safety manuals, and reference books such as those by
Alexander,20 Berry and Kohn,21 Harmer and Henderson,22 and
Walters,23 such a general list was not found. One list of
incidents occurring in hospitals was compiled by Ludlam. He

20Edythe

Louise Alexander, The Care of the Patient in
Surgery Including Techniques, Third edition, St. Louis: C. V.
Mosby Company, 1958, pp. 41-71, 128-146.
21Edna

Cornelia Berry and Mary Louise Kohn, Introduc
tion to Operating-Room Technique, New York: The Blakiston
Division McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955, pp. 22-29,39-45.
22Bertha

Harmer and Virginia Henderson, Textbook of
the Principles and Practice of Nursing, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955, pp. 225-226, 100Q, 1012-1013.
23carl

W. Walter, The Aseptic Treatment of Wounds,
New York: The Macmillan company, 1948, pp. 4-21, 188-189.

16

classified hospital incidents in fifteen categories. lie
included such categories as "Accidents in feed," "Baby identi24
fication," "Surgery and delivery incidents."
It seemed that when safety is considered in operational
terms, discussion centers around rules, or directives for
accident prevention in a particular situation. Such a list
of directives "was prepared by the California Hospital Associ
ation in the Hospital Safety Manual and includes several in
general surgery safety such as "Surgical rooms should have
25
swinging doors with glass partitions."
Quint at University of California at Los Angeles com
piled a list of what she termed "Basic Concepts of Patient
Care During Surgery." This list included nursing care cate
gories such as Maintaining a Safe Environment: Equipment and
Clothing; Maintaining a Safe Environment through Surgical
Asepsis; practices to Ensure Maintenance of Sterile Field;
Impact of Experience on the Patient; Anesthesia; Teamwork in
the Operating Room; and Patient^s position. Some of these
categories included such statements as "Spores of most heat

^4James F. Ludlam, "Guide to a Planned Safety Program,"
Hospitals, 29:68, December, 1955.
u^Hospital

Safety Manual, Council on Insurance, Cali
fornia Hospital Association and Argonaut Insurance, Qi.d.J
p. 4.

17
resistant organisms are destroyed at 270° F," *° "Certain
activities are set up to ensure a safe experience for the
patient.1,27
It will be noticed that these lists of categories and
directives are too general to fit the purpose of this study.
V. SUMMARY
A review of literature was made in the fields of
general, industrial, and hospital safety.

There was dif

ficulty in finding adequate definition of the term safety.
The need for safety, and safety education, was evidenced
through the reported high incidence of accidents and the
decrease of accidents in areas where safety programs were
in effect.

Equipment, working conditions and people were

found to be the major causes of accidents.
Rules or directives for accident prevention have been
developed for use in various occupations for encouraging
safety. Such lists have been developed for use in hospitals.
It would seem there is not a comprehensive list of such rules
or directives for particular use in the operating room.

26Jeanne

Quint, "Basic Concepts of Patient Care
During Surgery," 812SAB Medical-Surgical Nursing, Part II,
Los Angeles, School of Nursing, University of California
Medical Center, [n.dl], p. 4. (Mimeographed.)
2'ibid.,

p. 12.

CHAPTER III
GATHERING THE INCIDENTS
One purpose of the study was to identify incidents
that threatened the safety of patients in the care of
operating room personnel. In order to accomplish this
purpose, it was necessary to determine a method by which
these incidents could be obtained.
I. THE METHOD OF THE STUDY
The Critical Incident Defined
In an attempt to locate unexpected sources of safety
hazards in the operating room as revealed in accidents or
near-accidents, the critical incident technique was used as
the method for obtaining incidents for use in this study.
An incident has been defined to mean any observed act that
could ham the patient. However, in order for an incident
to be critical, it must have a purpose or intent that is
fairly clear to the observer and the consequences are suf
ficiently definite so that its effect is not doubtful.*
Flanagan who developed the critical incident technique
described it as follows:

'John C. Flanagan, "The Critical incident Technique,"
Psychological Bulletin, 51:327, July, 1954.
18

19

. . . The critical incident technique is essentially
a procedure for gathering certain important facts con
cerning behavior in defined situations. . . . The criti
cal incident technique does not consist of a single
rigid set of rules governing such data collection.
One of the applications of the critical incident tech
nique can be made in the area of routine activities called
"operating procedures" or "operations."

Flanagan points out

that systematic analysis of detailed factual data on suc
cesses and failures is of great importance in improving the
3
effectiveness and efficiency of operations."
An unsuccessful attempt was made to obtain the study
by Vasilas, Fitzpatrick, DuBois and Youtz in which they
developed procedures for collecting critical incidents relat
ing to near-accidents in flying. Some of the information
obtained in their study was made available in Research Notes
in which the authors encouraged analysis of near-accidents
as a means of prevention:
The effect of accidents and near-accidents are
different. But so far as their causes are concerned,
near-accidents do not seem to be in any fundamental
my different from accidents.
Can they, then, be used to supplement accident
reports as aids to prevention? . . . Accident pre
vention efforts should be concentrated on the aspects
of the situation which can most easily be changed.

^Tbid., p. 335.
'Ibid., p. 352.

20

What is needed as a basis for this kind of change
is a series of detailed statements which describe
what happened to bring on hazardous situations. . . .
It seemed that such a basis might be available in
reports of near-accidents.^
The incident Report Form Developed
Because the critical incident technique involves the
description of a particular action, an incident report form
was developed (Appendix A) to provide a uniform method for
reporting incidents which had threatened the safety of
patients.

Respondents were asked to identify themselves

only by position. Space was provided in which to describe
the incident that had occurred, to give the factors that
contributed to the occurrence of the incident and to indi
cate how the incident might have been prevented.
The Use of the Report Form
As this study was designed to obtain material for use
in teaching concepts of safety in operating room nursing and
as the studymaker was personally acquainted with operating
room personnel in the Great Lakes Region and would be teaching
in Illinois, it was decided to include those hospitals in
Illinois within which students or nursing received their

"Research on Near Accidents," Research Notes,
Pittsburg:' American Institute for Research, September, 1953,
p. 1.

operating room experience. A list of the 72 state accred
ited schools of nursing was obtained from the Illinois State
Department of Registration.
Letters were sent to the 72 directors of nurses ash
ing for permission to include the operating room clinical
instructor and operating room supervisor in the study.

A

copy of the incident report form was enclosed and a selfaddressed air mail postal card on which the director was
ashed to write the names of the operating room supervisor
and operating room clinical instructor. Also provided on
this card was a space to chech whether or not a copy of the
findings of the study was desired. (Appendix A)
Follow-up double postal cards were sent out two and
one-half weeks later. These cards were self-addressed and
provided a return form to be used if the original card had
been misplaced.

Fifty-one, or 71 per cent, of the directors

replied.
The Response obtained
Of the 51 who replied, five declined participation in
the study, two of whom were directors of university schools
of nursing who stated they had received no reports of inci
dents such as those requested. Of the three directors
associated with hospital.schools, one reported that "the

2?
accidents occurring in the operating room for which a nurse
might be liable were too infrequent for us to participate in
any study of errors."

Another stated: "We have no incidents

involving the safety of the patient in the operating room."
The third director gave no reason other than "We do not wish
to participate."
Letters ashing for cooperation in the study were
mailed to the operating room supervisors and clinical
instructors as soon as the names were received from the
directors.

The incident report forms and a self-addressed

air mail stamped envelope were enclosed with this letter.
Follow—up cards were mailed two weeks later. (Appendix A)
Fifty, or 76 per cent, of the 66 air mail letters
sent to the operating room supervisors and clinical instructors
were answered.

Replies were received from 28, or 65 per cersw,

of the 43 operating room supervisors and from 22, or 96 per

.

cent, of the 23 operating room clinical instructors*
Xt was not always possible to identify positively from
the reports the position of the participant.
there was no identification of position.

On some forms

From others it was

not possible to determine whether or not the participant
held a dual position.

Where there was doubt or where there

was indication the participant held a dual position the
respondent was considered to be a supervisor.

23

Three completed forms were not pertinent to the study
and had to be discarded.

Of these, two were concerned with

the safety of operating room personnel rather than the patient.
The third expressed the fear of accidents that could occur
rather than those that had occurred.
Eight forms were returned without incidents recorded.
Seven of these had explanations and one did not. One clini
cal instructor stated: "I have neither observed nor had any
incidents reported to me in months."

She expressed confi

dence in a very active in-service program which she felt was
effectively eliminating problems in the operating room.
Another instructor was unable to think of any specific inci
dents that had occurred and thoughtfully listed some of the
rules in effect in the operating room regarding explosion
hazards. Three of the supervisors made the following state
ments: (1) "We have not had such incidents during the past
few years," (2) "As long as I have been working in the operat
ing room no incidents threatening the safety of patients have
been observed," (3) "we try. . . to take precautionary meas
ures so that the incidents such as you want reported will not
occur."

It could be in these instances that the less dra

matic threats to patient safety are being overlooked, for as
Creber has pointed out, "Operating room hazards are not always

24
recognized or understood—and there is where the danger
lies."
One supervisor wrote a letter expressing the thought
that hospitals are prone to try to cover up incidents that
happened and that consequently answers on the forms would
not be accurate.

The form was described as being difficult

to answer because it asked to "pinpoint too specifically."
Thirty-nine operating room personnel submitted 100
usable incidents.

These incidents were classified according

to the nature of the incident as indicated in the next
chapter.
II.

SUMMARY

A list of the 72 state accredited schools of nursing
in Illinois was obtained and letters asking for participation
in the study were sent to the directors of nurses and to the
operating room supervisors and clinical instructors,

inci

dent report forms accompanied these letters to which 76 per
cent of the supervisors and instructors replied.

One hundred

usable incidents were received from 39 participants.

5Imogene

Creber, "Safety Measures in the Operating
Room," Nursing Outlook, 6:531, September, 1958.

CHAPTER IV
CLASSIFICATION OF INCIDENTS
I. METHOD OF CLASSIFICATION
One hundred usable incidents were received that had
caused accident or threatened the safety of patients who were
in the care of operating room personnel. These incidents were
classified to facilitate their use for teaching concepts of
patient safety.
The classification of incidents could have taken several
forms. As was indicated in Chapter II, safety has been con
sidered in different ways. The most helpful of these for the
purpose of this study were by type of accident as indicated
by McClain:1 mechanical, thermal, chemical, bacteriological
and psychological; by cause of accident, for example as given
by Yoder:

unsafe working conditions, unsafe manner of con

ducting business, and employment of incompetent workers; and by

"Esther McClain and Shirley Hawke Gragg, Scientific
Principles in Nursing, Third edition, St. Louis, The C. V.
Mosby company, 1958, p. 50.
'"Dale Yoder, Personnel Management and Industrial
Relations, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943, p. 482.
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principles or rules of safety such as listed by Quint:

O

for

example, nurse needs to be alert to breaks in technique of
self and others. These ways were considered as possible means
of classifying the incidents in this study.

However, it was

felt a classification that would more nearly fit into an
instructor's outline for teaching operating room nursing
would be more meaningful, and the following categories and
sub-categories were established:
A. Incidents pertaining to the use of supplies
1.
2.
3.
4.

Sponges
Needles
instruments
Other supplies

B. Incidents pertaining to the use of equipment
1. Equipment for positioning the patient for
surgery.
2. Equipment that caused burns
3. General equipment
C. incidents occurring during anesthesia
1.
2.

preparation for anesthesia
Explosions and fires

D. incidents occurring during transportation
1. Falls
2. Other than falls

^Jeanne Quint, "Basic Concepts of patient Care During
Surgery," N125AB Medical-Surgical Nursing, Part II, Los
Angeles! School of Nursing, University of California Medical
Center,'[n.dT] , p. 4. (Mimeographed.)
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E. Incidents related to asepsis
1. Attaining sterility
2. Maintaining sterility
F. Incidents concerned with identification
1. identification of the patient
2. Identification of the operative site
3. identification of medications
G. Incidents concerned with patient preparation for
surgery
The number of incidents reported by participants in
each category has been illustrated in Figure 1.
It was felt that classified incidents alone would not
be especially meaningful to the instructor for teaching
purposes. For this reason a list was prepared which included
the factors that had contributed to tne incident/ generalise""
tions for prevention of accidents identified from che incidence**
and generalisations put in behavioral terms in the form of
directives.
in analyzing the data on the incident report forms it
was found that incidents and their contributing factors could
be used directly. However, there was some overlapping of
measures which might have prevented incidents. These were
used for developing the directives for safety within each main
category of incidents. The incidents, the contributing
factors, and the directives •or safety have been prepared in
table form to facilitate usability in reaching. (Part II).
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FIGURE 1
PERCENTAGE OF INCIDENTS REPORTED THREATENING THE SAFETY OF THE
PATIENT IN THE CARE OF OPERATING ROOM PERSONNEL
ACCORDING TO SPECIFIED CATEGORIES
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The preventive measures which were suggested by those who
participated in the study were included in Appendix B.
As a guide in the discussion of the classification of
incidents, two aspects were considered: (1) the nature of
incidents which included a brief description of the types of
incidents which were included in the particular categories and
the number of incidents received in each category, and (2)
the contributing factors which contributed to occurrence of
incidents.
II.

INCIDENTS PERTAINING TO THE USE OF SUPPLIES

The Nature of Incidents
The largest group of incidents reported in this study
accounted for 25 per cent of all incidents.

These were

related to accidents or near-accidents which had to do with
the preparation and use of supplies.

In this group were

considered the smaller supplies such as sponges and needles
used in operating room nursing, as opposed to the larger or
heavier items used and termed "equipment" in this classifica
tion.
Sponges.

Eleven incidents pertained to missing

sponges and discrepancies in sponge counts.

Sponges were

left in the wound in six instances and three incorrect sponge
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counts were reported.

One report told of the wrong type of

sponge toeing used toy a nurse who was new in the situation.
Another nurse stated that she had caught herself counting
sponges automatically in some instances and had not remembered
taking a count in other instances.
Needles. Needles were responsible for problems in
eight instances. Four needles were lost and the others were
either broken, the wrong type, or contaminated by pricking
a gloved finger.

One report stated that one extra needle was

counted. Atraumatic or swaged-on needles were the cause of
incorrect counts in three instances.
Instruments. Instruments just taken from the auto
clave were responsible for actual burns in two instances and
presented a threat in the third.

The doctor was in a hurry

and in spite of the fact that the nurse told him the instrument
was hot, he used a urethral sound that had just been removed
from the autoclave. Hemostats that had not been cooled before
use caused a first degree burn.

Other instruments were placed

on the scrub table and could have burned the patient if used
right away.
Other supplies. The lack of chest drainage tubes
needed when a routine chest operation presented an emergency
aspect was reported in one instance.

One report was made of
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suture tubes that crushed when opened, presenting the danger
of introducing glass into the wound. Another incident told of
a small part of an instrument found on the floor following
surgery, the loss of which went unnoticed during the operation.
Summary of Contributing Factors
1. More care was needed in the handling of sponges
by members of the operating team.
2. Not all sponges used in the operative wound
were counted.
3. The use of atraumatic needles presented added
problems when checking the needle count.
4. Needles were improperly used and lacked identi
fication.
5. Care of instruments was lacking during the
operation.
6. instruments that had not been, properly cooled
were responsible for burns of patients.
7. More conscientious application of principles
was needed in the preparation of supplies.
III. INCIDENTS PERTAINING TO THE USE OF EQUIPMENT
The Nature of Incidents
The term equipment used in this classification refers
to the larger and heavier items such as table attachments used
in operating room nursing. There are many types of equipment
used in an operating room and the nursing personnel needs an
understanding of the purpose of each piece of equipment and
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how to use it safely.

Eighteen per cent of the incidents

received were caused by faulty or improper use of equipment.
Equipment for positioning the patient. Six incidents
reported in this study involved positioning of the patient and
the use of the operating table and its parts.
One supervisor reported the tipping of the operating
table when a patient was on it and both the patient and table
fell over onto the floor. Another told of the lack of arm
restraints so that the patient who was under very light anes
thesia reached up and placed her hand in the incision which
was being made.

A patient suffered a fracture of the toe

when her legs were being placed for lithotomy position. A
thin patient was reported to have developed a brachial plexus
paralysis following pelvic surgery from the improper use of
shoulder braces.
One more reported that the arm boards frequently fell
off from the table which could injure the shoulder.

Still

another told about the patient for vaginal surgery who was
moved from the cart to the table and the foot end of the
table gave way. The patient nearly fell to the floor but was
caught by the nurse.
Rmiioment that caused burns. Four electrical burns

II

I

n—ijfa

*"' •

'

'

were incurred through the use of the electro-surgical unit.
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All of the patients were burned by the indifferent electrode
placed under the patient but the contributing factors were
different. In. two instances the equipment was faulty: wires
were loose and insulation was worn off the cord. A loose
wire, the "sparingly" lubricated indifferent electrode and a
faulty contact between the electrode and the patient caused
another burn.
A hot flash of water was dropped from the carrier
designed especially to hold the flask. This could have burned
a patient.
General equipment. Two reports told of the need for
a resuscitator when a patient suddenly "went bad" on the
operating table.

No resuscitator was available in the depart

ment so one had to be brought up from the emergency room.
Although this equipment may not be common to the operating
room, it was suggested that such equipment should be kept in
a central location.
Equipment used in cystoscopy presented threats to
patient safety in two instances.

The switches were faulty on

both the cystoscopy table and formalin cabinet.

The patient

was on the table and when the switch was turned on, the control
started to smoke and fumes filled the room. The formalin
cabinet was said not to be dependable for sterilisation of
supplies because of the switch,
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One instance was reported in which the nurse tripped
over a light cord and could have pulled the light over injur
ing the patient.
During the removal of a cast, the patient's leg was
lacerated and the respondent stated that the doctor should
have used more padding under the cast.
Utensils dropped while being carried out of the room
caused the patient who was having surgery under local
anesthesia to jump.

This could have been very harmful to

the patient if the surgery had been at a crucial point.
Summary of Contributing Factors
1.

The need for a resuscitator was not met immedi
ately because the equipment was in another
department.

2.

The timer on a sterilizer was installed improp
erly so that the sterility was questionable.

3.

The patient was on a cystoscopy table that could
not be used because of a faulty switch that was
fuming and smoking.

4.

Because an operating table was old and in faulty
condition, both the table and the patient fell
on to the floor.

5.

A patient received a laceration from a cast cutter
because it was used incorrectly.

6.

Noise from utensils being dropped caused a patient
under local anesthesia to jump. This could have
caused harm.

7,

A

patient under light anesthesia put her hand into
the wound because no arm restraints had been used.
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8. A patient received a fractured toe during position
ing for operation by one unfamiliar with the equip
ment.
9. A brachial plexus paralysis was caused by incor
rectly placed shoulder braces.
10. Armboards falling off from the table were due to
carelessness or lack of knowledge in attaching
the armboards to the table.
11. A patient nearly fell from the table when the foot
end of the table dropped because it had not been
properly secured.
12. Faulty wiring was responsible for burns of patients
when the electro-surgical unit was used.
13. An insufficient amount of lubricating jelly on the
indifferent electrode was considered to be the
cause of a burn.
14. Improper placement of the indifferent electrode
was the apparent cause of a burn.
IV. INCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING ANESTHESIA
The Nature of Incidents
Although anesthesia is a separate department from
surgery the two are inter-dependent, sharing some of the
problems of patient care. The safety of the patient is
dependent on personnel from both departments.

Of the 15

per cent of incidents which occurred during anesthesia, some
occurred during induction of anesthesia in which operating
room personnel had a definite responsibility.
concerned with explosions and fires.

Others were

While this study was

mainly concerned with incidents other than fires and explo
sions, such hazards which were reported were included in the
study.
Preparation for anesthesia.

One report stated that the

operating room personnel were under pressure because the
schedule was running late; because of this the chart of one
patient was not checked before the patient was anesthetized.
As a result, anesthesia was started without the patient having
had the benefit of the pre-anesthesia medication.
Two patients fell from the operating table during the
induction stage of anesthesia; in one instance the circulat
ing nurse was not standing beside the patient and in the
other, the restraint strap had not been applied.

One report

told of a calculating nurse who was out of the room at the
time the incision was made; this could have been a crucial
moment.
An example of what can happen when the circulating
nurse is not in immediate attendance was reported in the fol
lowing instance.

An eleven month old baby was lying on the

operating table with the restraint strap secured over the
baby.

The anesthetist had been working with the child and

the circulating nurse had taken a few steps away from the
table,

in just "seconds" the baby had rolled onto the floor
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in spite of the restraint, because each of the two people
thought the other person was watching the patient.
In one hospital the operating room personnel prepared
the procaine used for local anesthesia. One operation was
performed under local anesthesia and when the patient
experienced severe pain it was discovered that the procaine
crystals had not been added to the solution. In another
instance the scrubbed nurse preparing the procaine for use,
added one cubic centimeter of adrenalin instead of the pre
scribed three drops. The error was found when the surgeon
checked the solution for the amount of adrenalin used.
An anesthetist placed a sponge saturated with aromatic
spirits of ammonia in front of the face of a patient after
tonsillectomy had been performed. The child was in prone
position and the sponge got under her face burning it
severely during transportation from the operating room to the
ward.
Explosions and fires. During a cesarean section a
spark was created by the nurse from the maternity ward who
was not wearing conductive shoes. Another report stated
that an explosion occurred because one of the personnel was
not wearing conductive shoes. In another instance, the
anesthetist's helper was adjusting the light and "sparks flew"
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when she touched the light.

She too was wearing non-conductive

shoes.
In another case the anesthetist pumped the breathing
bag when a semi-closed system was used. This forced the gases
out into the room adding to hazard of explosion.
One report told of the threat presented by doctors who
concealed lighted cigarettes while in the corridor of the
operating room and who even went to the door of an operating
room and talked to the surgeon who was operating.
Fire occurred in one operating room when the cautery
was used and the excess "prep" solution that had accumulated
on the indifferent electrode ignited. In another situation,
the doctor who was using cautery asked the nurse for an
alcohol sponge which could have caused fire.
Summary of Contributing Factors
1.

pressures of a schedule running late caused person
nel to neglect to check the chart so that a patient
did not have the benefit of pre-anesthesia medica
tion.

2. The circulating nurse did not remain beside the
oatient during induction of anesthesia.
3.

personnel wearing non-conductive shoes caused
sparks which could have caused explosions.

4. Fires occurred because of the use of alcohol in the
presence of cautery.
5. Aromatic spirits of ammonia on a sponge caused a
severe burn on the face of a child.
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6. Procaine crystals were left out of the preparation
of the solution because the procedure was not car
ried to completion by one person.
V. INCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING TRANSPORTATION
The Nature of Incidents
One phase of operating room nursing of major importance
to the safety of the patient is that of transportation. Trans
portation includes moving the patient on and off the litter to
or from the table or bed. The litter patient, according to
Morris, is always in a precarious position.1 In this study,
incidents involving transportation accounted for 15 per cent
of all occurrences and were classified into sub-areas.
Falls.

There were ten incidents reported involving

falls and of these, four were actual falls and sir were situ
ations in which the patients nearly fell.

One patient fell

from the stretcher as the orderly reached down to get the
restraint to place over the patient.

Another patient actually

fell and two others nearly fell while being moved from the
stretcher to the table or bed because the stretchers were not
stabilised. Another patient fell when the wheel of the
stretcher caught in the space between the elevator and the

xjohn

Problems,"

Morris, "Solving patient and Visitor Safety
Hospitals, 30;51, May 16, 1956.
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floor and still another fell from the stretcher in the recovery
room because the siderails had not been put into use. The
remaining four incidents reported were of patients who were
left unattended and without the safeguard of siderails or
restraint straps. In two of these instances, restraint straps
were provided but not utilised, and in the other two instances
no restraints were provided.
Other than falls. There were five incidents other than
falls which occurred during transportation.

An arm was

injured while the patient was wheeled through the doorway.
Contrary to policy, a patient was brought to surgery wearing
dentures. An anesthetized patient was left unattended in the
hallway. A patient was returned to the ward without a proper
airway and was cyanotic because the orderly transporting the
patient was untrained in caring for the anesthetized patient.
A patient was placed incorrectly on the stretcher by
untrained personnel making it difficult to obtain shock
position as needed.
Summary of Contributing Factors
1. Incidents involving falls and other occurrences
during transportation were the result of careless
ness of operating room personnel.
2. No restraints were provided.
3. operating room personnel had been given responsi
bility for which they had not received instruction.
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4. Falls which occurred during the transfer of the
patient to or from the stretcher resulted from
lack of personnel and lack of immobilization of
the stretcher.
VI. INCIDENTS RELATED TO ASEPSIS
The Hature of Incidents
The safety of the patient in the care of operating
room personnel is dependent on many factors of which asepsis
has become one of major importance. There are two aspects
concerned with asepsis, that of attaining sterility and that
of maintaining it.

The majority of incidents concerned

problems related to asepsis in which non-nursing personnel
were indicated as being responsible. The reports of inci
dents involving asepsis totalled 12 per cent of all reports
received.
Attaining sterility.

One incident told of a situation

in which unsterile wrapped instruments were almost used.

No

indicator had been used on either the inside or the outside
of the wrapper but the mistake was revealed when another
package with an indicator registered "unsterile."

Tracing

the problem to its source revealed that the time clock had
been read incorrectly and the autoclave was opened much
earlier than it should have been. In another instance a
basin was unsterile but was indicated as such by the pres
sure—sensitive tape used on the wrapper.
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Maintaining sterility.

A situation was cited in which

the scrubbed nurse passed several instruments behind the
doctor's back before she covered his back with a sterile towel.
The problem of contamination from street dust was
indicated by reports of three incidents in which doctors
walked into the operating rooms wearing street clothing. The
"houseman" who delivers linen to the departments and is also
responsible for the burning of trash and rubbish while wear
ing the same uniform was reported as another member of the
hospital personnel contributing to the problem of air-borne
contamination. Also presenting this threat is the keeping
of contaminated linen in a small area with other operating
room linen until it could be taken to the laundry by the
personnel delegated this responsibility.

Another report

told of a wound infection which suggested the possibility
of a break in aseptic technic. In two instances dust
presented problems as it fell from the track of the over
head light and from the conduits of the air conditioning
system.
One report stated that the maintenance man was found
changing filters in the sterile water tanks and was running
unsterile water into the tanks to test the filters for leak
age. This incident occurred while the schedule was still
in progress and the maintenance man had entered without
asking permission.
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Summary of Con.tribut.inq Factors
1. An indicator had not been used so that the dis
covery of the unsterile item was made accident
ally.
2. There were personnel who insisted on coming into
the operating room in street clothing thereby
contributing to air-borne infection.
3. Contaminated linen presented a problem of crosscontamination.
4. The position of the members of the operating team
made it necessary to pass instruments behind the
surgeons bach; this was done without the protec
tion of a sterile towel on his back.
5. Lack of good housekeeping presented the problem
of dust falling from equipment.
6. The sterile water supply was contaminated when
the filters were changed during the surgery
schedule.
VII. INCIDENTS CONCERNED WITH IDENTIFICATION
The Nature of Incidents
Identification plays an important part in the life of
each person.

The safety of the patient who comes to the

hospital for care is dependent to some extent on identifi
cation. Only as he is identified can the patient receive
the treatment prescribed for him by his physician. Of the
incidents received, 12 per cent show the importance of
identification of the patient, the operative site, the medi
cations used. Six incidents pertained to patient identifi
cation, one to the identification of the operative site, and
five to mistakes in the identification of medications.
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Identification of the patient. Two children who were
scheduled for tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy at the same
hour were placed in the wrong operating rooms and the wrong
doctor operated on one of the children before the mistake
was discovered. This same type of mistake occurred in
another instance but was discovered before the anesthetic
was started.

Wrong patients were brought to the operating

room in two instances and the wrong chart was brought on
one occasion. One report was made of the occurrence of a
lost identification tag.
Identification of the operative site.

A child was

anesthetized to have a foreign body removed from his hand
when a surgeon came in prepared to do the removal of the
child's tonsils. The anesthetist had to do some "fast
talking" to keep the doctor from removing the tonsils of a
child who was to have a foreign body removed, in this
situation, the schedule was running late and the doctor who
had not been informed of the delay walked into the room to
do his scheduled operation without checking the identity of
the patient. The nurse could have prevented this from hap
pening by notifying the doctor of the delay in the schedule.
Identification of medications.

In three instances the

wrong type of medication was injected because of lack of
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identification of the several solutions in medicine cups on
the scrubbed nurse's table.
A pint of type "A" positive blood was given to a
patient with type "A" negative blood.

The error was revealed

several days later when a patient questioned being charged
for a pint of blood when she had not received any. Clinical
laboratory personnel found the error. The patients receiving
the blood had the same type of surgery and the names of the
doctors were the same. Apparently this information had been
checked rather than the name of the patient who was receiv
ing the blood.
One patient had her throat sprayed with formalin
because the doctor filled the atomizer from a pontocaine
bottle that had been filled with formalin to be used as a
specimen jar. The label was still on the bottle as it had
been only partially removed.
Summary of Contributing Factors
1. patients were placed in the wrong operating rooms
by personnel who did not adequately identify the
patient.
2. Wrong patients were brought to the operating
room by new personnel who did not adequately
check the identification tags.
3. The wrong chart was brought with the right patient
because it had been filed incorrectly in the rack
and was not identified by the personnel.
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4. An identification tag was lost because it was
made from adhesive and did not adhere when the
patient perspired.
5. A child nearly had the wrong operation performed
because the surgeon had not been informed of a
delay in the surgery schedule and started to
operate on the child without identifying him
first.
6. Wrong medications were given because they were
not identified.
7. The wrong blood was given because the labels
were not checked completely.
8. A throat was sprayed with formalin because a
specimen jar still retained the original label
although it was being used for a specimen jar
containing formalin.
VIII. INCIDENTS CONCERNED WITH PATIENT
PREPARATION FOR SURGERY
The Nature of Incidents
The preparation of the patient for surgery should
mean more than the immediate preparation of the patient in
the operating room. The emotional and physical preparation
should be of such nature that the patient can have confi
dence in the personnel caring for him.
Two incidents concerning the physical preparation of
the patient were reported. The preliminary preparation of
the patient had not been done the night before surgery
accordina to the routine of the hospital, nor had the omission
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of the "prep" been reported by the nurse who was unable to
do it. Consequently the preparation had to be made on the
operating table when the patient was under anesthesia.

The

other incident was the report of the irritation, of the shin
of the perineum and thighs of a patient following perineal
surgery due to an excess of disinfectant solution.
The emotional factor and the psychological trauma
suffered by the patient when routines were not carried out
properly was reported by one operating room supervisor in
the following incident.

A female patient was admitted to the

operating room for an operation that required the signature
of both the husband and the wife. The husband had not been
ashed to sign the surgical permit and it was not possible
to contact him when the error was found in the operating
room. The operation had to be postponed.
Summary of contributing Factors
1. h patient had an increased amount of anesthesia
because the preliminary "prep" had not been done
nor reported and had to be carried out on the
operating table.
2. The shin of a patient was irritated by the dis
infectant used in preparing the shin for oper
ation and the excess amount had not been removed.
3. Hew staff members on the ward were not familiar
with the hospital routine and there was no chech list
on the chart that could be used as a reminder for
routine legal consent for surgery.
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IX. INTEHP RETATION
One of the values of the course in operating room
nursing for students is the vividness of the teaching
situations. Students have had courses in bacteriology;
they have studied asepsis in relation to general patient
care. In the operating room the instructor has opportunity
to explain in a more dramatic way the science of bacteri
ology. For example, in the laboratory the student grew
bacteria on broth media, incubated them in a warm, dark,
climate and watched them grow.

Now the student is told of

the need to prevent the introduction of bacteria into the
warm, dark wound.

Or, in physics class the student learns

the lav; of leverage.

Now this is illustrated in terms of

safety in correct holding of suture needles; unless the
needle is held correctly in the jaws of the needle holder,
there is danger of breakage. In giving general care to
patients students are told of the need to provide means for
protecting the patient who is unable to protect himself. In
the operating room the patient who has been given medication
to help him relax and be less apprehensive, must have constant
personal attention to protect him from injury. This is par
ticularly important during induction and recovery from anes
thesia. This learning must take place before an accident

48

occurs and can be taught vicariously through the use of
incidents.
It is doubtful that the 100 incidents classified
in this study provide examples of all the incidents that
could happen to threaten patient safety in the operating
room. For example, very few incidents were reported that
related to asepsis.

It may be that this is an area in

which the operating room personnel are particularly careful
because of its importance, or it may be that breaks in
asepsis are so common that they are not regarded as threats
to the safety of patients.

Also, the majority of incidents

reported relating to asepsis indicated non-nursing person
nel were responsible, perhaps operating room nurses saw
errors made by others and overlooked their own, or perhaps
special in-service education is needed for teaching the nonnurse employee. The student should be so taught that she
will be able to apply the principles of asepsis to her
activities and to recognize errors she may make in aseptic
technique. This "surgical conscience" becomes a part of her,
not Just as a student of nursing but as a future profes
sional nurse, and only when this is accomplished will she
be able to recognize errors in the technique of others.
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Only one incident was reported of the psychological
type mentioned by Mcclain.2

It may be that the wording on

the incident report form used in this study for gathering
incidents did not encourage reporting of incidents relating
to psychological trauma; or perhaps operating room person
nel need

to-be more aware of the effect of surgical routines

on the mind and feeling of the patient.

Somehow it is easier

to recognise physical accident than psychological.

Further

incidents need identification to help students gain appreci
ation for the person of the patient while in the often
impersonal atmosphere of the operating room.
Reference was made earlier to Yoder's statement in
which he gave three main causes of accidents: unsafe work
ing conditions, unsafe manner of conducting business and
employment of incompetent workers.3

The incidents that were

reviewed in this study were examined to see to what extent
they might fit into this classification. While the information
received about the contributing factors causing the incidents
was not explicit enough to make deductions about them, an
attempt was made to classify them according to Yoder's

"Esther McClain and Shirley Hawke Gragg, Scientific
Principles in Nursing, Third edition, St. Louis; The C. V.
Mosby Company, 1953, p. 50.

"Dale Yoder, Personnel Management and Industrial
Relations, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943, p. 432.

50

categories. It would seem the largest number of incidents
might have been caused by unsafe ways of working.

About

fifty per cent of those classified in the major areas seemed
to have been caused by either carelessness or negligence; it
was difficult to separate these causes. About fifteen per
cent were caused by poor communication or poor interpersonal
relationships between doctors and nurses.
Unsafe conditions accounted for about twenty per cent
of the accidents. These included such factors as management
seeming not to recognize need for new equipment and for safe
maintenance of equipment.

Only five of the participants

indicated lack of time might have been the cause of accidents.
However, this might have been a reason behind some of the
incidents seemingly caused by negligence and carelessness.
About ten per cent of the incidents were caused by
incompetent workers or by improper supervision of new
personnel. It is possible some of the incidents caused by
carelessness might have been caused by incompetent personnel.
It would seem that in an area of nursing where pre
cision and exactness is so important as in the operating room
that the way in which the operating room is managed needs to
be restudied. Perhaps many of the incidents were caused by
tension and pressures rather than outright carelessness or
negligence. It is possible that pressures of time, of
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scheduling, of emotions, of interpersonal relationships, of
health, need to he reduced to encourage fewer incidents
relating to threat to patient safety.
perhaps more emphasis needs to be placed on reasons
for rules or directives for safety. Thus personnel—and
students— could do more problem solving to apply principles
to specific situations rather than trying to live and work
by rules which do not cover all situations. Perhaps this too
might relieve tensions. It was noted that some participants
suggested that certain rules should be stated and "strictly
enforced," or that a certain incident was "inexcusable."
While there might be a place for "strict enforcement" and
"inexcusable behavior" it seems unfortunate that such should
be necessary for professional personnel who are working
together to maintain life in the operating room. It may be
this approach itself could cause unnecessary tension and be
a means of causing incidents which threaten patient safety.
For it is only as the environment of the student is controlled
and made free of undesirable tensions that students are
enabled to learn effectively.
IX. SUMMARY
The incidents received through the use of the critical
incident technique were classified according to the nature of
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the instance.

Seven groups were formed and discussed in

the order of their frequency.
The first group of incidents discussed were the twentyfive which came under the heading of supplies or those smaller
items such as sponges and needles used in operating room nurs
ing.

Eighteen incidents involving equipment—those larger

items used in caring for the patient in the operating roommade up the second group.
Incidents occurring during transportation and anes
thesia accounted for fifteen in each category.

Twelve

incidents related to asepsis and twelve were concerned with
identification.

The last classification included those inci

dents pertinent to the preparation of the patient for surgery.
A brief summary of the contributing factors which
related to the incidents was included in the discussion.
It was doubtful that the 100 incidents classified
illustrated all aspects of safety for teaching purposes.
Some possible suggestions were given by which improved con
ditions in the operating room could reduce the number of
incidents that occur.
A brief interpretation was given concerning (1) the
use of the incidents in teaching concepts of patient safety
and (2) the nature of incidents and the factors contribut
ing to the incident.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
I. SUMMARY
This study was conducted in an attempt to identify
incidents threatening the safety of patients in the care
of operating room personnel and to classify them for use
in teaching safety.

It was planned that the findings would

contribute to the teaching of concepts of patient safety
for students of operating room nursing through the use of
vicarious experiences.
Literature was reviewed to (1) survey established
concepts of safety and (2) find ways in which safety hazards
and accidents have been classified particularly as they
relate to hospital safety involving patients. The general
concepts of safety identified expressed the need for safe
working conditions and for personnel to have an attitude of
safety as well as sufficient knowledge and skills.

Safety

included freedom from mechanical, thermal, chemical, bac
teriological, and psychological injury.
The descriptive method of research was used,

inci

dents were gathered through the use of the critical incident
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technique in an attempt to locate unexpected possible sources
of accidents or near-accidents.
A list of the 72 state accredited schools of nursing
in Illinois was obtained and letters ashing for participation
in the study were sent to the directors of nurses and to the
operating room supervisors and clinical instructors in these
institutions. Fifty, or 76 per cent of the supervisors and
instructors replied.
One hundred usable incidents were reported on inci
dent report forms designed for use in this study. Partici
pants describing incidents included factors which contributed
to the occurrence of the incident and gave suggestion as to
how they thought the incident might have been prevented.
The incidents received were classified according to
their nature and under headings applicable to teaching.
Almost one-half of the incidents described pertained to the
use of supplies and equipment. Those incidents threatening
patients which occurred during transportation and during
anesthesia made up a little more than one quarter of the
total number.

Another fourth included those incidents which

were related to asepsis and identification.

Very few inci

dents were concerned with the preparation of the patient
for surgery.
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II. CONCLUSIONS
This study was based on the assumption that acci
dents occurred in the operating room that threatened the
safety of patients other than the commonly discussed
accidents of fires and explosions. This assumption has
been further validated by the fact that 39 operating room
personnel reported 100 incidents that threatened patient
safety in their operating rooms.
Analysis of the incidents revealed that the majority
of incidents or near-accidents could have been prevented
by improved ways of working.
All but one of the incidents were of a physical
nature.

One only was related to trauma to the psyche.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were made:
1. That a similar study be conducted perhaps to
gather all incidents threatening patient safety that occur
red within a selected period of time to find out to what
degree the incidents gathered in this study are illustrative
of operating room hazards which threaten patient safety.
2. That a similar study be conducted to identify
incidents that threaten the safety of personnel employed in
the operating room.

3. That a similar study be conducted at a future
time to find out to what extent hazards have changed. It
would be expected that present illustrations would be inade
quate as technological advances are made.
4. That a study be conducted to find out what patient
psychological reactions are to the operating room environment
5. That more emphasis on the human factor in teaching
students—and in in-service education—-is needed;

that

operating room personnel will be more sensitive to psycho
logically traumatic incidents and the need to allay unneces
sary fear.
6. That the incidents identified and classified in
this study be used to illustrate teaching concepts of safety
for patients in the care of operating room personnel.
7. That these incidents be used as problem situations
rather than mere illustrations of rules or directives, to
encourage greater student involvement, independent thinking
and problem solving.

PART II
THE INCIDENTS

PART II
THE INCIDENTS
In Part I of the study was shown how incidents which
threaten the safety of patients in the care of operating
room personnel were identified and classified. In Part II
of the study the incidents have been tabulated so that the
incidents, factors which contributed to their occurrence,
and directives for accident prevention, can be seen at a
glance. This has been done to facilitate the use of the
incidents for teaching purposes.
Where incidents were much alike they were not repeated.
The contributing factors which were given by the participants
were not edited, there different contributing factors were
given for similar incidents they were listed together.
Directives have been developed within each main
category. One directive may represent several types of
incidents within the category. Likewise, one incident may
have suggested more than one directive. No attempt has been
made to match the directives with the incidents other than
to include all directives within a given category which are
pertinent to the particular incidents.
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INCIDENTS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH ILLUSTRATE
DIRECTIVES FOR SAFETY OF THE PATIENT IN THE CARE OF
OPERATING ROOM PERSONNEL
A. INCIDENTS PERTAINING TO THE USE OF SUPPLIES

Contributing Factor

Directives for Safety

A sponge count was
reported incorrect
when peritoneum was
closed, patient was
x-rayed and sponge
was recovered.

Negligent handling of
sponges.

X-ray when sponges
are missing.

Two neurological
sponges were left
in a wound.

A neuro surgeon re
fused to have sponges
counted because all
sponges were taped.

A sponge count should
be taken in all oper
ations where the
depth and location of
the wound is such
that a sponge could
be accidentally lost
or left in the wound.

A sponge was left
intraperitoneally
during a vaginal
hysterectomy.

Two types of sponges
were used and the
surgeon did not allow
time for the sponge
count.
Sponge count not
taken before closure
of wound was begun.
Surgeon felt the
count was unneces
sary.

Incident
Sponges

4x4 (radio-opague)
sponge was not ac
counted for in a
vaginal excision
of cervix. Surgeon
reluctantly agreed
to an x-ray which
proved positive
and the sponge was
removed with dif
ficulty.
One month following
a vaginal hysterec
tomy the doctor
found a sponge in
vagina. Sponge
count was reported
on chart to be cor
rect

Sponges should be
checked frequently
when many are used.
All sponges should be
counted by two people,
one of whom should be
a nurse.
The nurse counting
sponges should be
alert—not preoc
cupied.
There should be no
interruption in the
sponge count.

Sponge count was
taken before and
after peritoneum was
closed. No count 'was
made during the
colporrhaphy.
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Record wrong sponge
counts even if the
sponge is located by
x-ray. This shows
value of the count.
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Incident

Contributing Factor

Directives for Safety

There were incor
rect sponge counts
on. laporotomies.

An additional sponge
was needed to wipe
off excess prep solu
tion and it was taken
from the counted
sponges. New Person
nel.

Sponges should not be
counted out loud, but
the count should be
compared by the two
who are counting and
recorded for refer
ence.

3x3 sponges lost
during operation.

Outside attraction
during first sponge
count.

The surgeon
requested a sponge
for vaginal packing
and was given a
regular sponge
instead of a radioopaque sponge.

New nurse misunder
stood request.
Surgeon did not
specify type of
sponge required.

Sponges should be
counted four times—
before sterilization,
when setting up for
surgery, before the
body cavity is closed,
and again before the
patient is moved from
the table.

Vihen counting
sponges a nurse
caught herself
counting auto
matically. She
did not remember
counting.

Nurse was pre
occupied or overly
busy and had to
count sponges
hurriedly.

Sponges used in the
operative field should
be x-ray detectable.
Sponges used for
"preps" should be dif
ferent in size and
quality from those
sponges used during
surgery. "Prep"
sponges should be
removed from the
room before the
incision is made.

Needles
On a routine x-ray
several years fol
lowing abdominal
surgery, a needle
was found in the
abdomen. This was
reported to the
operating room
supervisor.

Atraumatic needles
had not been
counted at the
time of surgery.

The nurse should
account for each
needle the surgeon
uses. She should be
sure she gets it back
before giving him
another.
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Incident

contributing Factor

Directives for Safety

A needle was miss
ing at the end of
the operation. The
abdomen was x-rayed
but the needle was
not located.

The nurse did not
check needle holders
for needles when
returned by the
surgeon.

All parts of a broken
needle must be
accounted for.

Atraumatic needle
was missing when
the final count
was taken.

Tubes of suture
were counted rather
than the needles.
One tube contained
standard rather
than atraumatic
suture.

Student was stuck
with a needle which
was discarded.

Carelessness in
handling needle.

During a crucial
moment in a thyroid
operation, the
surgeon was given a
needle.

Student was
scrubbed alone
without adequate
supervision.

A suture needle broke Needles were inand one part was
correctly placed
missing.
in the needle
holders.
When breaking
suture tubes, the
glass shattered and
small pieces adhered
to the suture.

Improper handling
of suture tubes.

Needles should be
confined to some
special area and not
permitted to lie on
the table or the
operative field.
The scrubbed nurse
should identify each
needle and know how
it is used.
Needles incorrectly
grasped in the holder
could cause the needle
to break.
Any needle perforat
ing a glove is con
taminated and should
be discarded.
All suture taken from
glass tubes should be
rinsed to be sure
there are no
particles of glass
adhering to it.

Instruments
A patient incurred
urethral burn be
cause surgeon in
serted urethral
sound that had just
been sterilized.

The surgeon took the
sound from the scrub
nurse and used it
even though she told
him it was hot.

Instruments should be
always handed to the
surgeon ready for use.
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Incident

Contributing Factor

Directives for Safetv

Hot instruments
were placed on
scrub table. Could
have been, used on
patient and
caused a burn.

Two operations run
ning close together
needed same instru
ments. Insufficient
time allowed for
cooling of heavy
instruments.

All instruments must
be checked for com
pleteness and effi
ciency before they are
used in the operation.

The instrument
nurse handed a
hot instrument
to the surgeon
who used it for
clamping off a
bleeder. The
patient was
burned.

More hemostats were
needed and they
were taken direct
from the autoclave
and used without
cooling.

Following abdomi
nal surgery the
bolt from the Bal
four Self-retain
ing abdominal
retractor was
found on the floor.

The bolt which had
been loosened for
sterilizing purposes
had not been
tightened.

Other Supplies
During chest
surgery the sur
geon had to close
rapidly because of
the poor condition
of the patient and
the chest tubes
needed were not
available.

The nurse who set
up for the
operation did not
have everything
in readiness.

Necessary supplies
should be available
and sterile.
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B. INCIDENTS PERTAINING TO THE USE OF EQUIPMENT

Incident

Contributing Factor

Directives for Safety

Equipment for Positioning the patient for
Surgery
As the incision was
made, the patient
put his hand into
the wound.

The patient was under
light anesthesia and
his arms were not
restrained

While the patient
was being placed
into or taken out
of lithotomy
position the toes
hit the metal stir
rup or were en
tangled in the
covers. Examina
tion revealed a
fractured toe.

Haste and assistance
by personnel unfa
miliar with the
equipment.

A patient developed
paralysis of
brachial plexus,
following pelvic
surgery on a thin
woman.

Shoulder braces
carelessly placed
for trendelenberg
position.

The use of all table
attachments should
be understood and
care should be exer
cised in the use of
each.

Armboard frequently
falls off table
when in use. Could
injure the shoulder,

Carelessness or lack
of knowledge of cor
rect placement of
armboard.

All operating room
personnel should
know how to operate
the table.

Patient for vaginal
surgery was moved
from the cart to
the table. The foot
of the table dropped
and patient almost
fell on the floor
but was caught by
the nurse.

Operating table was
old and had not been
checked to see that
locks were secured.

Personnel should be
instructed in the
proper use of equip
ment and potential
dangers involved in
its use.

The patient for
surgery should have
his arms in re
straints to prevent
them from being
injured and to keep
his hands from get
ting into the
operative field.
Brachial paralysis
injury is caused by
many factors in the
incorrect positioning
of the patient.

&4
Incident

Contributing Factor

Directives for Safety

Equipment that caused Burns
Patient was burned
by the indifferent
electrode.

Hot flash of
sterile water
dropped from
specially designed
carrier. Flash
brohe; burning the
nurse. Could have
burned patient or
contaminated the
sterile area.

Short in the mechanism
Faulty contact with
patient's shin. Plate
sparingly lubricated.
Loose wire in the con
nection. Insulation
for cord worn off at
point of attachment
to indifferent
electrode.
Carrier was inade
quate support for
the flash.

All electrical equip
ment should be
grounded properly to
prevent accidental
burns.
The indifferent
electrode should be
properly placed
avoiding hairy or
scarred tissue.
Lubricating jelly
used to cover the in
different electrode
should be used ac
cording to direction
of the manufacturer.
All cords should be
cheched for faulty
connections.
Solutions used during
the operation should
be hept at body
temperature.

General Equipment
During the removal
of a cast the leg
was lacerated.

Insufficient
padding.

Patient developed
a laryngeal spasm
and there was no
resusitator avail
able in the operat
ing room.

Resuscitator was
stored in the
emergency room or
basement.

The use of potentially
dangerous equipment
should be with extreme
precaution under proper
direction.
Equipment that might
be needed for an emer
gency should be hept
close at hand.
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incident

Contributing Factor

Directives for Safety

Cystoscopy instru
ment cabinet was
not installed
properly and the
sterilization was
questionable.
Switch was defec
tive.

Personnel are depend
ent upon quality and
proper installation.

All equipment should
be maintained in
proper working con
dition by periodic
checking to assure
that it is free from
defects.

Switches on the
cysto table not
working. While
the patient was in
position fumes and
smoke were noted.

Defective equipment
supplied by the
company.

When electrical equip
ment is used the
cords should be kept
away from traffic
areas.

Operating room table
tipped allowing
patient to fall on
the floor.

Faulty old equipment.

During operation
the circulating
nurse with arras full
of glass jars
tripped over
electric cord and
fell.

Hurry and electrical
cords to equipment
lying on the floor.

Utensils dropped
while being car
ried out from the
room. This fright
ened patient under
local anesthesia
with the result
that she jumped.

Nurse did not use
the table provided.
Noise startles
people so that
they cannot control
their actions.

Utensils and other
equipment should be
handled quietly as
noise can be disturb
ing to the patient.
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C. INCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING ANESTHESIA

Incident

Contributing Factor

Directive for Safetv

Preparation for Anesthesia
Circulating nurse
left room at the
time incision was
made. Incomplete
anesthesia could
have resulted in
a crisis.

Lack of thought on
the part of circulat
ing nurse. Need of
additional supplies
diverted her
attention.

Patient started
into the excitement
stage and nearly
fell from the table.

No personnel in at
tendance of patient
during induction.
Restraints had not
been placed over
patient's legs.

Baby was on the
operating table
with the knee strap
secured and a
blanket over the
baby. Circulating
nurse stepped a few
feet from table and
baby fell to the
floor.

The anesthetist and
circulating nurse
each thought the
other was watching
the baby.

Patient under local
anesthesia com
plained of severe
pain. It was dis
covered that the
novocaine prepared
by the hospital was
only water.

The person responsi
ble for preparation
and sterilization of
procaine had relied
on someone else to
add the crystals to
the flasks of water.
This was not done.

Scrub nurse added
one cc of adrenalin
to local anesthe
tic agent instead

Lack of application
of dosage by the
nurse who was rather
rushed in preparing

The chart should be
checked to see that
the preanesthetic
medication has been
given and recorded.
The circulating nurse
should remain with
the patient during the
induction to protect
him from harm.

The total preparation
of solutions should
be the responsibility
of one person.
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Incident

Contributing Factor

of iii gtts as
ordered. The error
was discovered by
the surgeon in rechecking the
dosage.

for the operation.

A sponge saturated
No thought was given
with aromatic
to the possibility
spirits of ammonia
of the burn from the
was placed beside
medication.
the face of a child
following a tonsil
lectomy. The child
was lying prone and
the sponge got under
the face producing
a severe burn before
it was noticed.

Directive for Safety

Medicated sponges
when used should not
be left beside an
unconscious or ir
responsible patient.

Explosions and Fires
Surgeons concealing
lighted cigarette
while in the operat
ing room corridor or
at the door while
talking to a surgeon
who was operating.

Surgeon believed that
the rule was "silly"
because there had
been no burns or ac
cidents in their
operating room.

Fire occurred when
cautery was used.

Excessive antiseptic
solution was on the
indifferent elect
rode plate. Nurse
was inexperienced.

The surgeon asked
for an alcohol
sponge while using
cautery.

Alcohol is flam
mable.

During cesarean
section the nurse

Nurse from maternity
was not wearing

Any open flame should
be prohibited in a
hazardous area.
Flammable agents
should not be used
for preparing the
skin when cautery is
used.
Conductive shoes
should be worn by all
personnel in the
operating room who
work in a hazardous
area. Shoes should be
tested for conduct
ivity and the results
of the test recorded.
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Incident

Contributing Factor

from maternity
caused a spark in
the operating room.

conductive soled shoes

Explosion occurred
in the operating
room.

Personnel not wearing
conductive shoes.

Anesthetist pumped
the bag when using
a semi-closed
system forced
gases into the
room presenting a
hazard of explo
sion.

Use of semi-closed
system—need to
pump breathing bag.

Anesthetist's
helper went to
adjust overhead
light and sparks
occurred when he
touched it.

Person involved was
not wearing conduc
tive shoes.

Directive for Safety

D. INCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING TRANSPORTATION
Falls
Patient fell from
stretcher when the
wheel caught in
the space between
elevator and door.

Stretcher without
siderails tipped.

When moving the
patient from the bed
to the stretcher, suf
ficient help should be
available.

Patient fell be
tween operating
table and the
stretcher.

in the split-second
in which the orderly
reached for the re
straint the patient
fell.

When moving the patient
from the stretcher to the
table or bed, both pieces
of equipment should be
stabilized by locking
the wheels or by
personnel.
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Incident

Contributing Factoi

Directive for Safety

Mien using Davis
patient roller to
move the patient
to operating table,
stretcher moved
away and patient
slipped between
table and the
stretcher.

Stretcher was not
stabilised.

The patient should be
strapped to the
stretcher to prevent
falls, especially if
sedated.

patient who had
general abdominal
surgery fell from
recovery cart
shortly after
surgery.

Side rails were
not placed on cart
in operating room,
insufficient
personnel.

Patient turning
on stretcher.

patient unattended
and without
restraint.

Transferring
patient from
stretcher to bed.

Lack of personnel
to help with the
transfer.

Patient nearly
fell when transfer
red between
stretcher and
operating room
table.

Stretcher not sup
ported against
table. Student and
aide were standing
on the wrong side
of table.

Care should be taken
to prevent injury, to
minimize trauma jerk
ing and bumping when
transporting the
patient to and from
the operating room.
The stretcher patient
should never be left
unattended or without
the safeguard of re
straints being fast
ened.
The patient should
be placed on the
stretcher properly
so that he can be
put into shock
position if needed.

Other than Falls
Carelessness of
Patient suffered
person in transport
slight injury to
ing the patient.
arm from having it
brushed against the
doorway when being
transported to
operating room.

All persons who trans
port patients should
have thorough instruct
ions and understanding
in the care of the
stretcher patient.
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Incident
Anesthesia was
started without
the patient hav
ing had a pre
operative medica
tion.

Contributing Factor

Directive for Safety

Chart was not checked
by ward or operating
room personnel.
Schedule running late
and personnel rushed.

If the anesthesia
policy does not permit
the wearing of den
tures and the patient
arrives in the operat
ing room wearing them,
the dentures should be
removed in surgery,
labelled and returned
with the patient to
the ward.

Patient for general Dentures had been
removed but left at
anesthesia came to
bedside and the
surgery wearing
patient replaced
dentures.
them.
patient on recovery- Operating room
stretcher backwards. personnel did not
check for head end
of stretcher.
Anesthetized
patient left un
attended and could
fall or aspirate.

Intern transporting
the patient,momen
tarily left patient
unattended.

Anesthetized
patient arrived
on the ward
cyanotic.

Airway out of place,
transportation being
done by untrained
personnel.

The anesthetist or a
staff nurse should
accompany the patient
from the operating
room to the recovery
room.

E. INCIDENTS RELATED TO ASEPSIS
Attaining sterility
Wrapped instruments
were unsterile. This
was discovered when
another package with
an indicator showed
to be unsterile as
were other articles.

No indicator either
on inside or outside
of wrapped instru
ments. Time clock had
been read incorrectly
and the autoclave whs
opened early.

All articles used in
an operation must be
sterilized.
A system for handling
supplies should be de
veloped and adhered to
whereby sterile and un
sterile supplies are
kept separate.
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Incident

contributing Factor

Directive for Safety

Splash basins were
unknown. Probably care
found to be unsterile. lessness on the part
This was shown by
of the person autopressure sensitive
claving.
tape.

If in doubt of the
sterility of an
article it should be
considered unsterile
and not used.

During the operation the nurse passed instruments
behind the surgeon's
back several times
before covering his
back with a towel.

The position of the
assistant was such
that the nurse could
not pass instruments
in any other way.

The temperature re
cording chart should
be checked daily by
the operating room
supervisor or the
head nurse.

Surgeons walking
into the operating
room with street
clothes.

Surgeon was late and
wanted to see the
patient before
patient was put to
sleep.

The back of the gown
should be considered
contaminated.
All bacteria cannot
be eliminated but
should be kept at an
irreducible minimum.

Lack of understand
ing on the part of
administration and
lack of communications Specific rules should
be made and enforced
on the part of the
regulating the traffic
supervisor.
in the operating room
in order to minimize
the introduction of
air-borne infection.
This should eliminate
4aintaining Sterility
personnel in street
clothes.
Contamination,
break
fjound infection.

Person who delivers
daily linen is
chief "houseman"
and as such is re
sponsible for burn
ing trash, etc.
Wears the same
clothing all day.

in aseptic technic,
contaminated air in
the room.

Heavy schedule pre
Contaminated linen
venting talcing linen
kept in operating
room suite until it to laundry immedi
could be picked up. ately.
Dust fell from
light track onto
drape.

Light was moved on
track dislodging
dust.

Contaminated linen
should be placed in
a bag marked "Contami
nated" and sent to the
laundry immediately.
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Incident
Maintenance men
were found chang
ing filters on
sterile water tanks
and running unsterile water to
test the filter.
Dust from air
conditioners in
operating room.

Contributing Factor

Directive for Safety

Maintenance men were
not intercepted.
Secretary was called
away momentarily.

Maintenance work
should be done at
specific times
arranged for by the
supervisors of the
departments at a
time when surgery is
not in progress.

Dirty filters in
'the air conditioners,

Housekeeping must be
done thoroughly.

F. INCIDENTS CONCERNED WITH IDENTIFICATION
Identification of the Patient
Two children
scheduled for
T and A's at the
same hour were
taken to wrong
rooms, one child
operated on by
the wrong doctor
before mistake
was discovered.

New orderly
delivered the
patients to the
operating room.

Patient for
surgery put in
the wrong room.

Two patients for
same type of
operation at the
same hour. New
student put the
patient in the
wrong operating

Patient lost
identification
tags placed on
the hand.

Adhesive of tag
made ineffective
by perspiration.

The patient should be
labeled in some way
so that identification
is assured.
The operating room
nurse should check the
identification label
of the patient with
the name listed on the
operating room
schedule which is
adjusted as changes
are made.
The nurse responsible
for the operating room
should have the surgeon
identify the patient
before the operation
is begun.
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Incident

Contributing Factor

Directive for Safety

The wrong patient
was brought to the
operating room.

No identification of
patient made by new
personnel.

In identifying
patient admitted to
the operating room
it was found the
right patient had
been, brought to
the operating room
with the wrong
chart.

Chart picked up by
room number only
and not checked by
patient's name.

The use of an operat
ing room call slip
which identifies the
patient can help to
prevent mistakes in
identity.

Identification of the Operative Site
A child was anes
thetized to have
hand surgery when
a surgeon came in
prepared to do a
T. and A. The
anesthetist con
vinced the doctor
it was not his
patient.

Surgery in this room
was running late and
the surgeon did not
identify the patient.

The operative site
should be verified
by a professional
member of the operat
ing team.

Identification of Medications
A bilateral herniorraphy was being
performed under
local anesthesia.
Second side was
injected with
hydrogen peroxide
instead of procaine,

Circulating nurse
who supplies medi
cations and solu
tions had poured
hydrogen peroxide
(for cleaning skin)
into the same type
of medicine cup as
used for procaine.

Wrong type of medi
cation was used for
injection purposes.
Alcohol was

personnel careless
in identifying medi
cations on the same
table. More than one

When more than one
solution is poured,
each cup of solution
must be identified.
All labels should be
correct.
The name and dosage
of the medication
should be stated as
it is handed to the
surgeon for adminis
tration.
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Incident

Contributing Factor

Directive for Safety

injected instead
of procaine.

unlabeled solution
on the table.

Patient for a local
tonsillectomy had
the throat sprayed
with a mixture of
pontocaine and
formalin.

The doctor filled
the atomizer from a
pontocaine bottle
with an old ponto
caine label on it.
This actually was
an old bottle
being used as a
specimen bottle.

Two professional
workers should check
the labels on blood
with the cross match
ing sheet on the
patient's chart and
with the patient's
identification.

A pint of type A/
blood given to
patient with a
type A- blood. The
mistake was dis
covered several
days later when
patient went to
pay the bill and
was charged for a
pint of blood which
she had never re
ceived.

Both patients were
for hysterectomy,
one a vaginal and
the other an abdomi
nal. surgeons' sur
names were the same.
Laboratory was
"called" for blood.

G.

INCIDENTS CONCERNED WITH PATIENT PREPARATION FOR SURGERY

Patient was admit
ted to the operat
ing room, the
surgery postponed
because the husband
had not been asked
to sign necessary
permit required for
surgery. The operat
ing room staff was
unable to contact
the husband.

No preparation
check list on chart.
New personnel on the
ward.

A check list
stipulating the
types of permits
and required
signatures could
be helpful in pre
venting errors
that could cause
delay or improperly
authorized operations.
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Incident

Contributing Factor

Directive for Safety

Skin of perineum
and thighs of
patient irritated
and sore following
perineal surgery.

Sensitivity of
patient to the
preparation
solution.

All excess "prep"
solution should ?oe
removed before the
patient is draped
for the operation.

The surgical
"prep" had to be
done on the table
after the patient
was under anes
thesia.

Night nurse was
too busy to do
the "prep" and
had neglected to
report the problem.

All preliminary skin
"preps" should be
done according to the
routine of the hospi
tal. When they are
done before the
patient is under anes
thesia the amount of
anesthesia is
lessened.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
FORMS USED FOR GATHERING INCIDENTS
1. Letter to the Director
2. Incident Report Form
3.

Return postal Card for use by the Director

4. Follow-up Card Sent to the Director
5. Letter to the Operating Room Supervisor and Clinical
Instructor
6. Follow-up Card sent to Operating Room Supervisors
and Clinical Instructors
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10763 Poplar St.

Loma Linda, calif.

Feb. 6, 1959

Dear Director:
In the mid-west there is much emphasis being placed on the
prevention of explosions and fires in the operating room.
Those of us who work in this area of nursing know that there
are other hazards that threaten patients, which if identi
fied could be used for teaching safety and prevention. As
an operating room supervisor and clinical instructor in
Hinsdale, Illinois I am interested in providing safety for
patients who are in the care of operating room personnel.
For this reason incidents which have occurred to patients
in care of operating room personnel are being gathered from
teaching hospitals in Illinois.
I am writing to ask your permission to contact your operat
ing room supervisor and operating room clinical instructor
whose help I need in this study. A copy of the incident
report blank to be used is enclosed; also a self-addressed
card for your convenience in sending me the names of these
nurses. It will take about 20-30 minutes to complete the
incident report blanks I will send to them. Of course names
and institutions will not be mentioned in the study.
This data is being gathered as part of a project to meet the
requirements for the master of science degree at the College
of Medical Evangelists and I hope it will be of benefit to
operating room personnel, particularly those responsible for
teaching. A copy of the summary of the findings will be sent
to you if you wish.
Your participation in this project is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,

Elsie D. V. Wendth, R.N.
EDW.-am
Enc.
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Position
OPERATING ROOM SUPERVISORS AND CLINICAL INSTRUCTORS

Briefly describe four (4) recently observed or reported incidents
threatening the safety of the patient who was in the care of op
erating room personnel. Provision has been made for reporting
the requested four specific incidents (preferably of different
types.) However, if you have had additional incidents, a report
of these will be appreciated. Thank you for your cooperation.
1. a. Describe the incident that occurred.

b. What factors contributed to the occurrence of the
incident?

c. How might this incident have been prevented?

2. a. Describe the incident that occurred.

b. What factors contributed to the occurrence of the
incident?

c. How might this incident have been prevented?

Please return to
Elsie D. V. Wendth
10763 poplar Street
Loma Linda, California

(next page please)

3.

4.

a.

Describe the incident that occurred.

b.

What factors contributed to the occurrence of the
incident?

c.

How might this incident have been prevented?

a.

Describe the incident that occurred.

b.

What factors contributed to the occurrence of the
incident?

c.

How might this incident have been prevented?

Please return to:
Elsie D. V. Wendth
10763 poplar street
Loma Linda, California
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RETURN POSTAL CARD FOR USE BY THE DIRECTOR

The following names are those you requested:
Operating room supervisor
Operating room clinical instructor
I would
I would not_

like to have a summary of the study

Signed_
(Name of hospital typed in)

FOLLOW-UP CARD SENT TO THE DIRECTOR

Dear Director:
Two weeks ago I sent you a letter asking for
your cooperation in a study I am conducting to
identify incidents that threaten the safety of the
patient in the care of operating room personnel,
perhaps you did not receive this.
I am wondering if it would be possible for you
to send me the names of your operating room super
visor and clinical instructor to whom I might send
an incident report blank. If it is possible for
these people to participate in this study, will
you please send their names on the attached card?
Thank you very much,
Elsie D. V. wendth
The following names are those you requested:
Operating room supervisor
Operating room clinical instructor
j would
I would not

like to have a summary of the study

Signed

S3

10763 Poplar Street
Loma Linda, calif.

Dear
Some of us in operating room supervision and
instruction in the mid-west have felt that there is
a need to identify hazards in the operating room in
addition to those concerned with fires and explosions.
I am conducting a study to do just this in the hope
that the findings will be useful in teaching safety
and prevention.
Your director has given me permission to ask you
for help in conducting this study. I realize that you
are terribly busy, but you are in an unusually good
situation to supply the information needed for this
study. The enclosed form can be completed within 20-30
minutes and of course, all information received will be
held in strict confidence.
Please return the completed form in the enclosed
stamped, self-addressed envelope. Your immediate help
in this study is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,

EDVW:am
Enc.
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FOLLOW-UP CARD SENT TO THE OPERATING ROOM SUPERVISORS
AND CLINICAL INSTRUCTORS

Dear Supervisor and Instructor:
Two weeks ago I sent you a letter asking for your
cooperation in a study I am conducting to identify
incidents that threaten the safety of the patient in
the care of operating room personnel.
Perhaps you have already sent the incident report
blank to me. If so, kindly disregard this card.
However, if you have not, I surely would appreciate
it if you could send it to me immediately. Your
participation is needed in this study.
Thank you so very much,
Elsie D. V. Wendth
10763 Poplar Street
Loma Linda, California

APPENDIX B
PREVENTIVE MEASURES WHICH STUDY PARTICIPANTS INDICATED
MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED STATED INCIDENTS
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PREVENTIVE MEASURES WHICH STUDY PARTICIPANTS INDICATED
MIGHT HAVE PREVENTED STATED INCIDENTS
A. Preventive Measures Pertaining to the Use of Supplies
1. Sponges
A more careful count of all free sponges.
Insist that all sponges, regardless of type, be
counted. Have strict rules set up by a committee.
Four by four sponges should have been used from the
very beginning. More attention should be paid to
sponges laid in the operative area and left there
for a short period. Surgeon should have allowed
sufficient time for the sponge count.
Nursing personnel could have been more observant
and called for a count earlier. Cooperation from
surgeons in calling for a sponge count before
closure and in the discarding of sponges used so
they can be collected for a count.
Counting sponges earlier in procedure.
Take two counts, before and after the peritoneum
is closed. Account for all the sponges again before
the patient leaves the operating room table.
Circulating nurse could have checked the prep table
more carefully before discarding sponges. She had
used a counted sponge to wipe excess solution from
area which should not have been necessary as plain
uncounted sponges were available.
Giving careful attention or strict attention to the
counting of the sponges before the operation started.
More emphasis on importance of sponge count and
closer correlation between graduate and student in
operating room when instructor is not available.
Doctor should have specified the kind of sponge he
needed since radio-opaque sponges are counted and
regular four by four's used for wipes are not.
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Keep track of sponges used by marking down on record
the number of packs opened and again when recounted
at the end of surgery.
2.

Needles
Counting of atraumatic needles.
Another needle should not be passed to the surgeon
before the one in use is located by the scrub nurse.
Needles should always be attached securely in a
suture towel or on a needle holder so they will not
be brushed off the sterile towel.
The circulating nurse should watch closely as she
takes tubes from the suture jar to make sure they
contain needles. Scrub nurse and circulating nurse
must check to be sure that the atraumatic tubes of
suture are labeled correctly and the number taken
recorded.
Stress in staff education the necessity of having
accurate needle counts, change procedure so that
both scrub nurse and circulating nurse must count
added atraumatic needles. The circulating nurse
must record the addition immediately.
Student should have graduate nurse scrub with her,
or if this is not possible, the graduate nurse should
be in the room and should check all needles used before
they are given to the doctor.
Place needle properly in needle holder.

3.

Instruments
Should have been checked before surgery and again
before retractor was handed to the doctor.
Nurse should have insisted that the urethral sound
be cooled.
Instruments should have been sent out as soon as
finished, from the first case to be autoclaved—or
a new set ordered.
If it is necessary to sterilise more instruments, they
should be cooled before giving them to the surgeon.
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4. Other Supplies
Adequate preparation on part of nurse, set of chest
tubes kept sterile for emergency use.
Better technique and better wrapping of suture tube
before breaking.
Preventive Measures Pertaining to the Use of Equipment
1. Equipment for Positioning the Patient for Surgery
Having the respirator on hand at all times.
Convenient placement of emergency equipment. Frequent
inservice meetings which would deal with the efficient
use of emergency equipment for all operating room
personnel.
Need emergency switch to turn off motor and electricity.
Abandon the policy of making old equipment 'do.'
Insist that old equipment be removed from the operating
room.
The operating room nurse should take sufficient time
to perform all of her duties and at all times be aware
of existing hazards.
The nurse should encourage the surgeon to use more
padding under casts.
The nurse could have used the proper equipment or
else she should have carried fewer utensils.
2. Equipment That Caused Burns
Check equipment before use to see it is in perfect
working order.
Proper placement of the indifferent electode. it
should not be applied to a hairy surface or to skin
extensively scarred.
Thoroughly checking the equipment before using.
Application of more electrode paste.
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All equipment snould be closely inspected to detect
any faulty areas. Faulty equipment should not be
used. Proper reporting of the improperly function
ing equipment and removing it from use until it has
been repaired.
Obtain a better carrier or a better method to transfer
hot water.
3. General Equipment
Careful handling of patients as they are being
positioned.
Shoulder braces placed on outer part of the shoulder,
over the area away from the neck and checked often
during the procedure. Trendelenburg position not
more severe than 45*. Pad the area if procedure is
going to involve a considerable length of time.
Care in placing armboard on the table so that the
latch will catch.
If nurse had checked the table before putting the
patient on the table this would have been prevented.
C. Preventive Measures Pertaining to Incidents which Occurred
During Anesthesia
1. Preparation for Anesthesia
Adequate help for amount of surgery to be done. Con
tinuous education so that nurse does not neglect the
patient. Human interest in the patient is important.
See that the patients are well secured before start
ing general anesthesia.
Use effective wist and arm restraints.
Regardless of the other needs of the department or
room, the place of priority for the nurse should be
beside the patient during induction. This is a"must"
regardless of the type of induction.
At all times there should be an educated and reliable
person responsible for the patient while in the
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operating room. This responsibility should be so
delegated that no confusion or misunderstanding could
ever happen.
Eliminating the use of aromatic spirits of ammonia
sponges before the patient has reacted from the
anesthetic.
Only one person should be responsible for filling
bottles with both the distilled xvater and novocaine.
If the distilled water is not on hand, concentrated
novocaine crystals should be placed next to the empty
bottle marked as such to indicate that it must be
added before sterilisation.
Strict observation of the usual ways in administration
of medications on the part of every member involved in
applying the medication—the scrub nurse, circulating
nurse and surgeon.
More conscientious attitude by nursing personnel
regarding pre-operative preparation. Improved
scheduling methods to prevent operating room person
nel from feeling obligated to hurry.
2.

Explosions and Fires
Strict regulations enforcing the wearing of conductive
shoes by each person in the department REGARDLESS.
All people in operating room wearing conductive shoes,
equipment and floors conductive and more consideration
in not touching anesthesia machines.
Use of different system—closed—by the anesthetists.
Proper instruction to new personnel in operating room
apparel and safety measures.
Doctors dressing room outside the depar ._rfk--r.it and
strict enforcement of rules by Safety committee.
Better staff education so the staff is familiar with
all operating room equipment.
Operating room nurses should adhere to rules of the
operating room at all times and one is that alcohol
is not used as a disinfectant where the cautery is
being used.
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D*

Preventive Measures Pertaining to Transportation
1. Falls
Use Hausted type of stretcher.
Proper orientation to execution of duties. More close
supervision.
Alertness of personnel at time of patient's return to
ward. Patiently waiting for personnel to assemble.
Strapping the patient on the cart and securing ad
ditional help such as aides when transporting patients.
When it is observed that personnel leave the patients
after examination without replacing the protective
straps it is suggested that they observe the regulation
that all patients be restrained while in the operating
room. Inservice education on the replacing of pro
tective straps immediately upon completion of exami
nation.
Restraints on all surgical carts.
Sufficient help so persons will be available to stay
with patients.
Although careful instruction was given in the use of
the Davis-patient roller, repeated return demonstra
tions and observation is necessary until use is firmly
implanted in the minds of all personnel.
If the orderly had reached over the patient instead

of reaching under the cart it might have prevented the
fall. Also, with the patient reacting from the anes
thetic, the anesthetist could have watched more closely.

Side rails should have been placed on cart as soon as
patient was transferred from operating room table.
More personnel should be provided for in the recovery
room and the number determined by number of patients.
2. Other than falls
Just prior to going through doorway, patient should be
asked to keep arms in against body. Arms would be
less apt to be injured if kept within the sheets.
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The jar containing the dentures should have been
put away in the patient's locker.
Simply checking cart before placing patient on it to
make sure it is known which is head and foot end of
cart.
Better and closer screening of auxilliary operating
room personnel. Intensive instruction as to methods
employed in maintaining a patent airway, A recovery
room is needed.
Instruct interns never to leave anesthetized patients
unattended on cart during transportation.
E.

Preventive Measures pertaining to Asepsis
1.

Attaining sterility
If an indicator had been on the outside of the wrapper,
the mistake would have been noticed sooner. The nurse
should have been more careful in reading the time
clock.
Conscientious effort on the part of all personnel who
are responsible for sterilization and distribution of
supplies.

2.

Maintaining sterility
Change in the position of the assistant and if this
is not possible sterile towels placed on the backs of
the operating personnel immediately following draping
of the patient and before the incision made.
Have the doctor's dressing room outside of the depart
ment. Enforcing staff rules so doctors come in time
for their cases. Proper reporting to cimmittee on
infections.
More strict enforcement of rules and regulations by
the committee on infections.
Change hospital policy regarding the distribution of
linen to the operating room.
More emphasis on sterile technic to personnel in the
operating room. Discontinuing visitors in the operat
ing room.
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Convert to individual soiled linen bag technique.
Linen from each case bagged, tagged and sent to the
laundry.
Dust tracks immediately before schedule starts each
day rather than weekly.
Clean air conditioning filters routinely.
Setting a definite time for changing of water filters.
Maintenance men instructed to contact supervisor or
assistant before attempting any project, or have work
done in the P.M.'s by maintenance men. Introduce
flasks of sterile water. Dispense with water tanks
completely.
Preventive Measures Pertaining to Identification
1. Identification of the Patient
Design an identification card to be pinned to the
patient before leaving the surgical floor.
Using plastic identification bands around the wrist.
Make sure the correct patient is placed in the correct
room when doing two identical procedures.
Better identification of patients.
Individual responsible for patient transportation
should check schedule to see they are brought at the
scheduled time.
Replacement of chart in proper section by individuals
using chart. Head nurse should have made final check
of patient and chart before leaving floor.
2.

Identification of the Operative Site
Attempt should have been made to inform surgeon of
delay. Hospital regulations were not carried out.
Identification of the patient should have been made
by the doctor before the anesthetic was started.
Identification bands might have been helpful.
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3. Identification of Medications
Use of different types of containers for solutions.
Call scrub nurse's attention to the fact that there
are other solutions on her stands. Identify all
solution containers in some way that is known to all
operating room personnel. Make it a rule not to pour
hydrogen peroxide till operative procedure is finished.
Proper identification of medication. More care on
part of nurses necessary. Closer supervision between
graduate and student.
Do not use alcohol in any procedure on which novocaine
is used.
Specimen label or tag should have been attached to
specimen jar containing formalin. Pontocain label
should have been completely removed before using
bottle for other purpose.
G.

Preventive Measures Concerned with patient Preparation
for Surgery

Removing excess solution after the prep so that the
skin does not remain in contact with large amounts
for a prolonged time.
Ascertain before surgery if the patient is allergic
and if so, to what.
Making adequate provision for preps to be done night
before surgery.
Provision made on pre-op sheet to designate prep so
that it will be known if patient had not been prepped.
A check list containing pertinent details such as
T.P.R., Dentures removed, Surgery consent, etc.
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ABSTRACT
The study was conducted in an attempt to identify
incidents threatening the safety of patients in the care
of operating room personnel and to classify them for use
in teaching safety in operating room nursing.
Literature was reviewed to find concepts of safety
and to aid in classification of safety hazards which are
applicable to hospital patient safety.

Need was shown for

safe working conditions and for personnel with attitudes
of safety as well as skills and knowledge.

Safety included

freedom from mechanical, thermal, chemical, bacteriological,
and psychological injury.
The descriptive method of research using the critical
incident technique was used for this study.

One hundred

incidents were reported by 39 operating room supervisors and
clinical instructors in Illinois.

Besides describing the

incident the participants reported the factors contributing
to the incident and suggested preventive measures.
Classification of the incidents was according to
nature and under headings applicable to teaching.

About one-

half pertained to the use of supplies and equipment while
transportation and anesthesia accounted for over one-rourth
ii

of the incidents.

Another fourth included those incidents

which were related to asepsis and identification of the
patient, the operative site, and medications.

Very few

incidents pertained to the preparation of the patient for
surgery.
•The incidents, their contributing factors, and
directives for safe operating room nursing practice were
presented in tabular form.
A brief interpretation was made regarding the causes
of incidents as these were given by the participants.

Sug

gestions were made for the use of the incidents for teaching
safety in the operating room to students of nursing.
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